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Abstract
This article introduces the V-Forecast project, the forecasting intuitive of the Varieties
of Democracy (V-Dem) institute. In this the initial year of the V-Forecast project, we
provide two-year ahead forecasts of the risk of adverse regime transitions (ARTs) for 169
countries. ARTs are substantial movements of a country’s regime towards more author-
itarian governance, whether authoritarian reversals in a democracy, or further autocra-
tization in an already nondemocratic country. Examples include Hungary and Poland
over the past few years, which are prominent cases in a more widespread and worrying
global trend over that effects a significant fraction of the world’s population. Yet so far,
there has been no public forecasting system for anticipating new ARTs and identifying
countries most at risk. We describe an effort that forecasts ARTs – operationalized using
the Regimes of the World (RoW) categorization – with an ensemble model that leverages
V-Dem and several additional external data sources. Despite being rare events with a
roughly four percent baseline chance over any two-year period, in test forecasts the model
is able to achieve good accuracy.
1 Introduction & Executive Summary
In recent years, political elites in a number of third wave democracies – most notably,
Hungary, Poland, the Philippines, and Turkey – have been systematically undermining
important democratic norms and institutions (Bermeo 2016, Diamond 2015, Kurlantzick
2013, Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018, Lu¨hrmann & Lindberg 2019, Lu¨hrmann, Mechkova, et al.
2018, Mechkova et al. 2017). In fact, no less than 24 countries experienced some form of
democratic erosion between 2007 and 2017, affecting one third of the world’s population
and “represent[ing] a massive reduction in the global protection of rights and freedoms”
(Lu¨hrmann, Dahlum, et al. 2018, p. 6). While the effects are often more diffuse and
less intense than those associated with other political phenomena such as civil conflict,
democratic erosion arguably has a greater negative impact on more people worldwide
and over a longer term. Therefore, developing models that can help identify countries
at risk of democratic erosion is of tremendous importance. This article introduces the
V-Forecast project, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) institute’s efforts at developing
these models.
There are a number of forecasting efforts currently underway throughout the inter-
national relations and comparative politics research communities. These projects range
from predicting the onset of civil and international conflict (Brandt et al. 2011, Hegre et
al. 2019, 2013) and mass killings and atrocities (Goldsmith & Butcher 2018, Goldsmith
et al. 2013, Woocher et al. 2018) to whether a country will experience an irregular lead-
ership change (Beger et al. 2016, Ward & Beger 2017) and political instability, in general
(Goldstone et al. 2010). For the most part, these forecasting efforts focus on estimat-
ing the potential risk that a country will experience some form of political violence. To
our knowledge, the field lacks a comprehensive forecasting system looking specifically at
democratic erosion. With the goal of developing a suite of forecasting models focused on
phenomena related to democratic erosion, the V-Forecast project aims to fill this gap.
As an initial step, the V-Forecast project is focusing on estimating a country’s risk of
experiencing an adverse regime transition (ART) within a two-year window. We concep-
tualize ARTs as a decline in the democratic qualities of a country’s political regime. These
declines can coincide with violent events such as coups and internal conflict. The military
coup in Thailand in 2014 and the civil conflict (and subsequent coup) in Mali in 2012
are clear manifestations of ARTs that occur through these more violent processes. An
ART can also stem from an incumbent regime’s repressive response to political protests,
as was the case in Bangladesh in 2012 when the government used violence to suppress
protests. Further, ARTs also capture the gradual erosion of democratic norms and in-
stitutions. The events that have unfolded in Hungary over the past few years – Prime
Minister Orba´n’s attacks on judicial constraints on executive power and his curtailment
of media freedoms – is an example of this type of ART.
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We capture ARTs using the Regimes of the World (RoW) index, which classifies
political regimes as either a closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral democracy,
or liberal democracy (Lu¨hrmann, Tannenberg, & Lindberg 2018). While we plan to
explore additional operationalization strategies in subsequent iterations of this project,
we currently operationalize adverse regime transition as a year-to-year decrease in the
RoW index. That is, an ART occurs when a country moves down the RoW index from
one year to the next. We forecast the risk that such an event will occur within a two-year
window. We describe our outcome variable in more detail in Section 2.2.
To produce our estimated risk forecasts, we use V-Dem data version 9 (Coppedge et
al. 2019b, Lindberg et al. 2014) along with UN GDP and population data, ethnic power
relations data (Vogt et al. 2015), coup event data (Powell & Thyne 2011), and armed
conflict data (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Pettersson & Eck 2018), over 400 variables altogether.
We use these data in three machine learning models: logit with elastic-net regularization,
random forest, and gradient boosted forest. To help account for differences across these
models, we use an unweighted model average ensemble. This is our preferred approach,
as it helps smooth out our predictions while improving accuracy. Also, by using off-the-
shelf machine learning models and an unweighted average of these models, this approach
is also relatively simple and quite transparent. We detail our data set and outline our
estimation techniques in Section 2.
In Section 3, we discuss our framework for evaluating model performance. In partic-
ular, Section 3 describes our 2×7-fold cross-validation procedure and our performance
metrics, e.g., Area Under the Curve-Precision/Recall (AUC-PR). While aggregate mea-
sures of model performance are standard practice, they do not allow researchers to assess
how randomness or other fluctuations on the data might be affecting model performance
from year to year. In short, the accuracy of our yearly forecasts, which is dependent on
the actual observed ARTs in a given year, are likely to deviate.
To assess how robust our models are to these fluctuations, we conduct a series of yearly
test forecasts for 2011 through 2017. These test forecasts mimic the process we use to
generate our “live” two-year-out forecasts, allowing us to infer the general performance
of our 2019-2020 forecasts. Further, to evaluate whether groups of countries with similar
predicted probabilities will experience ARTs at the rate implied by the group’s risk scores
and to assess whether our models are over- or under-predicting ARTs, we conduct a series
of calibration tests and simulation experiments.
Based on industry standards for models and prediction problems of this nature (i.e.,
machine learning models for rare-events), our models preform remarkably well. Our en-
semble model reports an AUC-PR score of 0.46 in our 2×7 repeated cross-validation
procedure and an AUC-PR score of 0.39 in our set of yearly test forecasts. As a general
benchmark of performance, an AUC-PR score that is higher than the observed frequency
of events in the data is a signal that the model is an improvement over chance. With an
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Figure 1: Estimated Risk of ART for 2019-2020 (Ensemble Model)
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60
169
156
143
130
117
104
91
78
65
52
39
26
13
1
All Observations
R
an
ke
d 
Ri
sk
Highest Predicted Risk: 46% 20: Ghana
19: Turkmenistan
18: Slovenia
17: Mauritius
16: Nicaragua
15: Italy
14: Czech Republic
13: The Gambia
12: Benin
11: Albania
10: Tanzania
9: Bosnia and Herzegovina
8: Moldova
7: Kyrgyzstan
6: Kosovo
5: Guatemala
4: Hungary
3: Mali
2: Fiji
1: Philippines
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Top 20 Countries
observed frequency of ARTs at roughly 4 percent, our ensemble model exceeds perfor-
mance expectations.
Using the estimated probabilities for the top-ten cases for 2017-2018, we can use
simulation techniques to determine how many ARTs we would have expected to occur
within the set of top-ten estimates. Based on these simulations, we find that there was a
61 percent chance that at least three observations would have experienced an ART in our
set from 2017-2018, with a 14 percent chance of five or more ARTs. The actual number
of ARTs in the 2017-2018 top-ten estimated risk cases was five; thus, our ensemble model
produced rather conservative estimates.
Looking now at our estimates for 2019-2020, the panel on the left in Figure 1 shows
the range and spread of our risk estimates for 2019-2020, while the panel on the right
focuses on the top-20 at-risk cases. Using these estimated probabilities, our simulation
procedure suggests that there is a 75 percent chance that there will be at least two ARTs
within the top-ten cases for this prediction window. Given the general performance of our
ensemble model and these simulation results, a conservative estimate is that at least one
of the top-ten should experience an adverse regime transition in 2019 or 2020. Section 4
provides a detailed discussion of our 2019-2020 forecasts.1
Nevertheless, it is important to note here that these forecasts are probabilistic. A
high estimated risk does not mean that an ART will occur with certainty; similarly, a low
estimate does not mean that an ART will not occur. Simply put, these are probabilities
not certainties.
1A complete list of all 169 risk forecasts can be found in Table 7 in Appendix A
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Moving forward, we plan to explore other ways of operationalizing ARTs. On current
approach, which relies on the RoW classification scheme, is potentially risky. The uses
of threshold cutoffs across a number of different V-Dem variables when determining a
country’s RoW class means we run the risk of capturing small changes in border cases
rather than substantial and significant decreases in the democratic qualities of a country.
We address this issue in our discussion of our outcome variable, Section 2.2, and in our
concluding remarks.
In the near-term, we also plan to expand the scope of this project by focusing on
distinct forms of democratic erosion as well as electoral violence. In particular, we are
developing a series of thematic forecasting models that estimate the risk that there will
be a decline in six dimensions of democracy: (1) elections, (2) civil society, (3) freedom of
expression and media, (4) public corruption, (5) democratic inclusion, and (6) legislative
and judicial constraints on the use of executive power. By developing forecasting models
for a variety of autocratization phenomena and by making these predictions public, the
V-Forecast project hopes to provide useful tools for policy-makers and aid agencies.
2 Methodology
We use country-years as our unit of analysis and limit our temporal frame to 1970-2018.
We reconcile the differences between the V-Dem country-year set and the Gleditsch and
Ward (GW) country-year set to facilitate the use of external data (e.g., coup data, UN
population data, etc.).2 This leaves 169 countries for our 2019-2020 forecasts. Our
training and validation country-year set captures 7,754 observations.
2.1 Data
V-Dem version 9 is our primary data source; 417 of the 451 variables we have in our
data set come from or are derivatives of V-Dem data. UN GDP and population data,
ethnic power relations data (Vogt et al. 2015), coup event data (Powell & Thyne 2011),
and UCDP’s internal armed conflict data (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Pettersson & Eck 2018)
make up the remaining 34 variables in our data set. We lag all variables one year and
derive the first differences for a number of variables. In brief, we use data from 2011 to
estimate the risk that an ART will occur in 2012 or 2013, for example. A complete list
of variables as well as basic descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix E.
2We drop the following eight countries from the V-Dem set: Sa˜o Tome´ and Principe, Seychelles,
Vanuatu, Palestine/West Bank, Palestine/Gaza, Somaliland, Hong Kong, and Zanzibar, as they lack
coverage in the GW country-year set. Along with micro-states, we drop the following four countries from
the GW set: Bahamas, Belize, Malta, and Brunei, as they lack coverage across the V-Dem county-year
set. We also drop Bahrain from the GW set. While the V-Dem data provides some coverage of Bahrain,
there are missing values for the entire series of Bahrain across a number of key indices; therefore, we
excluded it. The number of countries in our data per year ranges from 137 to 169.
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There are several missing values throughout the V-Dem data. For the most part,
this missingness is concentrated around variables related to elections and the legislative
branch. Most missingness is the product of four V-Dem coding rules: (1) when elections
are permitted, election specific variables are not scored for the years between elections, (2)
when elections are not permitted or when there is an interruption, all elections variables
during that period are not recorded, (3) in the event of an interruption, key legislative-
related variables are also not recorded,3 and (4) legislative-related variables are not coded
for the first year that institution was enacted.
When elections are permitted, we fill in missing variables by carrying forward the
last non-missing value. If an election-related variable is missing because elections were
not permitted or because there was an interruption, we set these observations to zero
and create a dummy variable indicating whether the elections were, in theory, permitted.
Similarly, when legislative-related variables are missing due to an interruption, we set
these observations to zero and create a dummy variable signaling this change.4 Finally,
we back-fill all legislative variables that are missing because it is the first year of that
there was a viable legislative branch. We maintain annotated code for all changes made
to the original V-Dem v9 data.5
2.2 Adverse Regime Transitions
We operationalize adverse regime transitions using the Regimes of the World (RoW)
index. This index classifies political regimes as either a closed autocracy, electoral au-
tocracy, electoral democracy, or liberal democracy. To produce these classifications, the
RoW index takes into account the quality of a country’s electoral institutions (e.g., the
presence of multiparty elections and the quality of these elections), its liberal character-
istics (e.g., legislative and judicial constraints on the use of executive power), as well as
the regime’s record across various civil liberties indices (e.g., adherence to the rule of law
and secure and effective access to the judicial system).6 An adverse regime transition
occurs when a country moves down this scale (going from an electoral autocracy to a
3According to the V-Dem Codebook, an “interruption” is typically the result of a coup, declared
state of emergency, or military defeat (For election variables, see Coppedge et al. (2019a, p. 275), and
for legislative variables, see Coppedge et al. (2019a, p. 46 and 132-35).
4In the Data Appendix E below these variables are named is elec and is leg.
5Our data management R code is available upon request.
6Specifically, the RoW index classifies countries according to the following criteria: “Electoral democ-
racies score above 2 on the indicators for multi-party (v2elmulpar osp) and free and fair elections
(v2elfrfair osp), as well as above 0.5 on the Electoral Democracy Index (v2x polyarchy). Liberal
democracy meets the criteria for Electoral democracy but also satisfy the liberal dimensions by a score
above 0.8 on the V-Dem Liberal Component index (v2x liberal), as well as a score above 3 on trans-
parent law enforcement (v2cltrnslw osp), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm osp) and women
(v2clacjstw osp). Electoral autocracies fail to meet one or more of the above-mentioned criteria of
electoral democracies, but subject the chief executive and the legislature to de-jure multiparty elections
as indicated by a score above 1 on the V-Dem multiparty elections indicator (v2elmulpar osp leg/ ex).
Closed autocracies do not satisfy the latter criterion” (Coppedge et al. 2019a, p. 219).
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Table 1: Year-to-Year Transition Frequency Table – 1970-2018
To:
Liberal Electoral Electoral Closed
Democracy Democracy Autocracy Autocracy
From:
Liberal Democracy 20.45% 0.30% 0.00% 0.00%
Electoral Democracy 0.52% 19.18% 1.01% 0.12%
Electoral Autocracy 0.03% 1.70% 25.05% 1.02%
Closed Autocracy 0.00% 0.09% 1.92% 28.63%
closed autocracy, for example) from one year to the next. We provide a complete list of
all ARTs in Appendix D.
One concern with our current operationalization is that we may be identifying small
real-world changes when the underlying components of the RoW variable start near the
RoW thresholds. In future work, we will assess robustness with alternative operational-
izations of ARTs. Nonetheless, we should note that most recorded ARTs represented
substantial adverse events or are part of a sustained, but gradual democratic erosion
processes. Take, for example, the ART we capture in Togo in 2016 when the regime
was downgraded from an electoral democracy to an electoral autocracy. While Togo was
a border case on key RoW component variables in 2015, the events that pushed Togo
past the threshold were significantly detrimental. For example, in the run-up to the 2015
elections, the government banned all forms of protest and imprisoned political opposition
leaders and supporter. Further, Amnesty International reports that a number of those
detained were tortured while others were put on trial without access to a lawyer.
Conversely, the ART that we capture in Albania in 2017, for example, seems to be a
function of a slight decrease in the Liberal Component index. It was a liberal democracy
in 2016 but was downgraded to an electoral democracy in 2017 when its score on the
Liberal Component index fell from 0.8 to 0.79, thus below the threshold of 0.8 used by
the RoW index to classify a country as a liberal democracy. However, Albania (and
similar cases) represent regimes that are influx; they are fragile regimes, unstable in their
current class. Our models should be able to identify which of these unstable regimes are
in greater need of democracy support.
Table 1 presents the frequency of all movements in the RoW index at yearly level;
bold text highlights the frequency of ARTs. There were 189 adverse regime transitions,
or roughly 2.4 percent of our country-year observations. There was no change in the
RoW index in 93.31 percent of our observations. From 1970 to 2018, the average number
of adverse regime transitions per year was 3.86, with a standard deviation of 2.34, and
the maximum number of adverse regime transitions in a year was ten in 2010 while two
years (1986 and 2011) experienced no adverse regime transitions.
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Figure 2: Adverse Regime Transitions by Year
Because we are interested in forecasting the estimated risk that an ART will occur
within a two-year window, our dependent variable records a country-year observation a
one if there is any negative change in the RoW index within the next two years, zero
otherwise – e.g., if country X experienced an ART in 2013, this event is reflected in the
data (coded as a one) for 2012 and 2013. This increases the number of positive cases to
369 (4.76 percent). This is slightly less than double the number of year-to-year ARTs, as
Bolivia, Malaysia, and Somalia experienced an adverse regime transition in the first year
of our sample (1970), while other countries experienced adverse regime transitions in two
consecutive years (Chile in 1973 and 1974, Argentina in 1976 and 1977, Bangladesh in
2006 and 2007, and Thailand in 2013 and 2014), or had two adverse regime transitions
within three years (Cambodia in 1971 and 1973 and Guinea-Bissau in 2008 and 2010).
Figure 2 plots the number of ARTs per year (1970-2018) as well as the number of
ARTs that occurred within the two-year window (our dependent variable). The yearly
average number of ARTs that occur within a two-year window was 7.53, with a standard
deviation of 3.46. The maximum number of adverse regime transitions within a two-year
window was 17 in 2012. Two years, 1986 and 1988, experienced the minimum number
of ARTs (two) within a two-year window. As the yearly number of countries in our
sample ranges from 135 to 169, the effective positive rate of our dependent variable in
any given year varies from around 1.4 percent to 10 percent; roughly 75 percent of our
yearly positive rates are between 3.8 percent and 5.6 percent.
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2.3 Modeling
Looking across the universe of adverse regime transitions, one thing is clear: incumbent
political elites can lead their country down a number of different paths that would trigger
an adverse regime transition (Coppedge 2017). This equifinality – the different political
processes that can lead to an ART – complicates the use of more traditional methodolog-
ical approaches in prediction problems. Indeed, while traditional methods of description,
explanation, and inference can perform well at explaining the onset of important political
events ex-post, when researchers apply these well-established methods to prediction prob-
lems, they tend to perform poorly (Beger et al. 2016, Hill & Jones 2014, Schrodt 2014,
Soyer & Hogarth 2012, Ward et al. 2010). To overcome these problems, social scientists
have been borrowing forecasting methods from other fields – machine learning methods
from computer science, in particular. While machine learning methods are not a panacea
(Bowlsby et al. 2019, Cederman & Weidmann 2017), they do offer promise, in the form
of improved out-of-sample accuracy, over more traditional methods.
This project uses an unweighted model average ensemble built around three machine
learning models: logit with elastic-net regularization, random forest, and gradient boosted
forest.7 Each of these forecasting algorithms takes advantage of the full set of covariates
within our expansive dataset, which helps them account for the different, complex, and
interrelated political processes that can lead to an adverse regime transition. However,
because each of algorithm samples and processes the data differently when calculating
the predicted risk of an ART event, some models are better able to predict specific cases.
Further, the within method variance of the assigned predicted probabilities tends to be
quite different.
For example, relative to our gradient boosted forest model, our random forest model
generally produces more gradual, incremental increases in its predicted risk estimates. For
our prediction problem, the gradient boosted forest model tends to produce a lot of really
low estimates followed by a handful of relatively high estimates. Moreover, the estimates
from our logit with elastic-net regularization model tend to be too conservative while our
random forest model tends to produce very large estimates. Thus, the unweighted model
average ensemble is our preferred approach to estimation, as it not only helps smooth
out our predicted risk estimates, but it also improves accuracy, as measured by standard
performance statistics.
The machine learning models we use in our ensemble model are becoming increasingly
popular among social scientists. For example, the Early Warning Project uses the logit
with elastic-net regularization method to forecast mass killings (Woocher et al. 2018), and
the random forest model is one of the methods Hegre et al. (2019) at the ViEWS project
use to predict various types of political violence. However, while Gohdes (2019) uses the
7We provide a brief, nontechnical overview of the mechanics behind each of these machine learning
methods in Appendix B.
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gradient boosted forest method for a classification problem looking at the relationship
between internet accessibility and the type and target of political violence in Syria, to
our knowledge, we are the first to adapt this approach to a forecasting problem centered
around a distinct political phenomenon.
3 Evaluating model performance
Our framework for evaluating overall model performance is two-fold, and entirely based
on out-of-sample performance:
1. Repeated k-fold cross-validation on the training period from 1970 to 2017 in order
to obtain out-of-sample predictions for those years.
2. A series of test forecasts for the years from 2011 to 2017 that mimic the process we
use to generate our “live” two-year-out forecasts for 2019-2020.
The first approach, the repeated k-fold cross-validation, allows us to assess out-of-
sample performance for the complete history the models use for training. The objective
of this procedure is to assess a model’s ability to predict new, out-of-sample data (i.e., the
generalizability of a model, or rather how well a model should preform given new data).
In short, k-fold k-fold cross-validation (CV) procedures work by randomly dividing all
observations into k roughly equally-sized groups. In series, each unique group is set
aside to serve as “test data,” while the remaining k − 1 groups are “training data.”
These training data are used to fit a model, while the test data is used to evaluate
the performance of this fitted model. This process is repeated k times. Thus, each
of the k-groups of observations are used once in the testing phase and k − 1 times in
the training phase. The average performance statistics from these train/test iterations
provide researchers with a general sense a model’s predictive accuracy.
One concern with the standard k-fold CV approach is that the processes that led to
ARTs in the past might be different from the processes that trigger ARTs in more recent
years. Thus, it is important to check how well a model performs under conditions that
mimic current conditions. The second approach, our set of yearly test forecasts, addresses
this concern. These test forecasts give us a better assessment of recent performance and
how well the live forecasts are likely to perform. It also gives us some insight in how
much performance differs from year to year due to randomness or other fluctuations.
In addition to assessing overall performance, we also examined two additional aspects.
The first is calibration, which examines how accurate or valid the probabilities produced
by the model are. The second is a simulation experiment where we assess how well the
global number of ARTs implied by the model’s forecasts matches observed numbers of
ARTs.
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Table 2: Repeated cross-validation (2×7) performance, 1970-2017
Model AUC-ROC AUC-PR Brier
Logit w/Elastic-net Regularization 0.85 0.30 0.039
Random Forest 0.91 0.40 0.035
Gradient Boosted Forest 0.92 0.42 0.035
Ensemble 0.93 0.46 0.034
We summarize the performance of our models using three standard statistics: Brier,
Area Under the Curve-Receiver/Operating Characteristic (AUC-ROC), and Area Under
the Curve-Precision/Recall (AUC-PR) scores. The Brier score is the mean squared differ-
ence between the predicted probability and the observed outcome. The AUC-ROC metric
measures the balance between the true positive rate and the false positive rate at different
acceptance thresholds (the value in which a predicted probability is classified as a one).
The AUC-PR metric measures the trade-off between precision, the positive predictive
value, and recall, the true positive rate, across the range of acceptance thresholds.8
For the Brier score, the lower the score, the better; however, higher AUC-ROC and
AUC-PR scores suggest better model performance. Moreover, an AUC-ROC score above
0.50 signals that the model is preforming better than random chance. And, an AUC-
PR score that is higher than the observed frequency of events in the data is a signal
that the model is an improvement over random chance. For class-imbalanced prediction
problems (when the dependent variable is a rare event) like the one currently under
consideration, the AUC-PR measure is better suited since it is more sensitive to how well
a model predicts positive cases. Thus, the AUC-PR is our preferred metric of assessment
performance.
3.1 Cross-validation
Due to the sparsity of our dependent variable, we use a 7-fold CV procedure to help
ensure variation in our dependent variable within each test/train split. We repeat this
process two times (2×7-fold CV), recording the mean predicted value for each observation
and comparing these scores to the observed value. Since this cross-validation assessment
covers a larger number of cases, it provides a more robust accuracy estimate.
Table 2 summarizes the results from our 2×7 CV procedure for our ensemble and
component models. From Table 2, we see that our ensemble model outperforms our other
models across our three performance metrics. Figure 3 presents a series of separation
plots based on our 2×7 CV procedure. To produce these plots, we sort the average
8True Positive Rate = True Positives / (True Positives + False Negatives); False Positive Rate =
False Positives / (False Positives + True Negatives); Positive Predictive Value = True Positives / (True
Positives + False Positives).
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Figure 3: Separation plots from the 2×7-fold CV procedure, 1970-2017
Logit w/Elastic-net Regularization
Random Forest
Gradient Boosted Forest
Ensemble
predicted probability for each observation from our 2×7 CV procedure (the green line
running horizontally) and highlight whether an observation had an ART within the two-
year prediction window (the dark purple vertical lines). The more concentrated the dark
purple lines are to the right of the plot, the better the model performs within our 2×7-fold
CV framework.
The green average predicted probability line for each of the three machine learning
models highlights the variability of estimates produced by these different methods. The
step-like jump at the right side of the elastic-net plot, the relatively higher predictions
across the random forest plot, and the sharp, almost exponential increase seen in the
gradient boosted forest plot add justification for using an unweighted average model
ensemble. As seen in the bottom plot, the ensemble model helps address these differences.
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Table 3: Test forecast performance, 2011-2017 (pooled)
Model AUC-ROC AUC-PR Brier
Logit w/Elastic-net Regularization 0.78 0.26 0.064
Random Forest 0.82 0.37 0.059
Gradient Boosted Forest 0.81 0.36 0.061
Ensemble 0.84 0.39 0.059
3.2 Yearly test forecasts
Our series of yearly test forecasts provide a better assessment of the expected accuracy of
our “live” forecasts since they more closely replicate those conditions and reflect year-to-
year variance in forecast accuracy, which depends heavily on variation in realized adverse
regime transitions in a given year. This requires that we conduct a series of train/test
experiments. We first train our models using all data from 1970 to 2010. We then use
data from 2011 to produce estimated risk forecasts for 2012-13 and evaluate how well
our models preformed. We then retrain our models using all data from 1970 to 2011, use
data from 2012 to produce estimates for 2013-14, and evaluate model performance. We
conduct this iterative model check procedure for all years, 2011 to 2017.
Table 3 summarizes the results for all of the yearly test forecasts. Here too we see that
our ensemble model outperforms our other models. Thus, while we present all relevant
information for each of the component models in Appendix C, our discussion moving
forward will now center on the general performance of our ensemble model.
While pooled summary assessment like those found in Tables 3 and 2 are the standard
way to gauge a model’s accuracy, the accuracy of the forecasts in any given year is going
to deviate to some extent from the overall mean measures. Table 4 show the performance
of our ensemble model for each of our yearly test forecasts. For the AUC-ROC column, a
score greater than 0.5 is an indicator that the model performed better than the baseline
for that year. And, for the AUC-PR a score greater than the observed positive rate in
the data, listed under the Y¯ column, is an indicator that the model outperformed the
baseline for that year.
The AUC-ROC values range from a minimum and maximum of 0.74 to 0.95, with most
values in the 0.8 range. The AUC-PR values are more variable, which is expected for
rare outcomes like these ARTs. It ranges from 0.15, which is low but still an informative
improvement over that year’s 0.05 base rate, to 0.51. Overall, there is a lot of variation in
performance from year to year; however, the performance metrics for each year suggest
that our ensemble model is an improvement over naive models.
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Table 4: Performance of the tests forecasts by year, Ensemble model
Year AUC-ROC AUC-PR Y¯ ARTs
2011 0.74 0.15 0.05 8
2012 0.88 0.51 0.10 17
2013 0.95 0.41 0.07 11
2014 0.84 0.23 0.06 10
2015 0.81 0.30 0.09 15
2016 0.88 0.49 0.09 15
2017 0.81 0.37 0.08 14
3.3 Model calibration
The model’s forecasts are probabilities ranging from zero to one, where values near zero
and one indicate near certainty that an event will not or will occur, respectively. In a
well-calibrated model, we can take the probabilities at face value, e.g., if we had a set of
countries with forecasts of 0.5, we can expect that roughly half of them experience an
ART, and we should observe that this was indeed the case in the real world.
One way to assess this question is to bin the model’s probabilities into equally sized
groups of similar probabilities, e.g., top ten percent, next ten percent, etc., and compare
the number of ARTs implied by the set of probabilities in a bin to the actual number of
ARTs that occurred for those countries. Table 5 shows the results if we do this with the
full set of cross-validation out-of-sample predictions (i.e., from our 2×7 CV procedure).
The first column shows the probability ranges that we use for grouping, or binning, cases.
They were chosen to divide the data into 10 equal groups of increasing probabilities. Note
that the model’s predictions are strongly skewed, with the majority of probabilities falling
near zero, and less than a tenth falling above a probability of 0.1. The second and third
columns show the average probability for a bin and the implied number of ARTs we
would have expected to see. The last two columns show the actual number of ARTs
observed and whether, as a result, the model’s predictions in that bin were too high
(“+”) or too low (“−”). The model’s forecasted probabilities are slightly too high for
lower risk countries, about 80 percent of cases, and too low for the higher risk countries
in the remaining 20 percent. Overall, the total number of ARTs predicted out of sample
is fairly conservative, with 343 anticipated ARTs against 369 observed ARTs.
Figure 4 is a calibration plot that also shows the model predictions, on the x-axis,
against observed outcomes on the y-axis. The black points correspond to the “Mean P”
and rate of “Actual ARTs” (i.e., observed ARTs over number of cases in a bin) from
Table 5. The blue line is a smoothed estimate of the relationship between the two, which
confirms the interpretation above. Below probabilities of 0.05, the model is too aggressive,
while above 0.05 it is too conservative and underpredicts.
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Table 5: Calibration: expected versus actual number of ARTs by forecast decile, Ensemble
model
Bin Mean P Expected ARTs Actual ARTs Direction
[0.0009, 0.004] 0.003 2.3 0 +
(0.004, 0.006] 0.005 3.9 0 +
(0.006, 0.008] 0.007 5.5 2 +
(0.008, 0.012] 0.010 7.9 2 +
(0.012, 0.017] 0.015 11.5 2 +
(0.017, 0.024] 0.021 16.0 5 +
(0.024, 0.034] 0.029 22.3 9 +
(0.034, 0.053] 0.042 32.5 21 +
(0.053, 0.111] 0.076 59.0 71 −
(0.111, 0.759] 0.235 182.6 257 −
Figure 4: Calibration plot, Ensemble model
3.4 Simulations
Another way to assess the forecasts from our ensemble model is to evaluate how well
our yearly test forecast collectively match the real-world outcome we observed in a given
year. To do this we can take all of the model’s forecasts for a year, which gives us a set
of 169 probabilities, and then we “simulate” the world by drawing hypothetical ARTs
for each country in accordance with the respective probabilities. It is as if we had a
coin to represent each country, flipped them all, and counted the number of heads we
get. Except that the coins are all biased in accordance with the model forecasts. With
a perfect model, we would expect that the number of hypothetical ARTs we get in this
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Figure 5: Expected number of worldwide ARTs given the ensemble model’s test forecasts.
simulation to more or less match the number of ARTs we observe in reality. There is a
lot of randomness here: one simulation will likely be different from another. So, we do
20,000 of them, and count up how many ARTs each simulated world gave us. We repeat
this process for all test year forecasts.
Figure 5 shows the output of our simulation experiment. The gray densities summarize
the number of ARTs we got in each of the 20,000 simulated worlds. Each black dot is the
actual number of ARTs that happened that within a specific two-year forecast window.
So, for example, for the 2011-2012 window, our simulations were pretty close to the
observed outcome, whereas for the next 2012-2013 window, the actual number of ARTs
was much higher than our simulations would have led us to believe. Overall, the output
from these simulations again suggest that our ensemble model is somewhat conservative
and under-predicts the global number of ARTs by about two to four in any given forecast
window.
4 Current forecasts
Based on the simulations using the forecasts 2019-2020, we expect there to be between
five and 15 ARTs overall; 90 percent of our simulations fall into this range. The most
likely number of ARTs in our 2019-2020 forecast window is ten; at 13 percent, this is the
modal category in our simulation. By doing the simulation exercise with only the top
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Table 6: Top 20 Estimated Risks, 2019-2020
Country Estimated RoW Year since
Name Risk Classification last ART
1 Philippines 0.460 Electoral Democracy 14
2 Fiji 0.265 Electoral Democracy 2
3 Mali 0.254 Electoral Democracy 6
4 Hungary 0.250 Electoral Democracy 8
5 Guatemala 0.249 Electoral Democracy 35
6 Kosovo 0.228 Electoral Democracy 6
7 Kyrgyzstan 0.217 Electoral Democracy 2
8 Moldova 0.200 Electoral Democracy 10
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.193 Electoral Democracy 26
10 Tanzania 0.182 Electoral Democracy 2
11 Albania 0.170 Liberal Democracy 1
12 Benin 0.164 Liberal Democracy 3
13 The Gambia 0.143 Electoral Democracy 23
14 Czech Republic 0.129 Liberal Democracy 79
15 Italy 0.126 Liberal Democracy 94
16 Nicaragua 0.122 Electoral Autocracy 11
17 Mauritius 0.120 Liberal Democracy 1
18 Slovenia 0.115 Liberal Democracy 29
19 Turkmenistan 0.106 Electoral Autocracy 6
20 Ghana 0.106 Liberal Democracy 3
20 forecasts, we can also derive some expectations for how many of those countries will
experience an ART. This procedure suggests that the most likely number of ARTs in the
top 20 is four; 90 percent of our simulations fell between one and seven ARTs.
Table 6 presents these top 20 at-risk countries for 2019-2020. Aside from a country’s
rank and its estimated risk, Table 6 also includes the country’s RoW classification for
2018 and the number of year since it last experienced an ART.9 For careful observers,
a number of these top 20 countries should not come as a surprise. In fact, recent news
reports suggest that some of these countries are already displaying signs of adverse regime
transition. We discuss a few of these cases below.
The actions of President Duterte of the Philippines over the last few years are reason
for concern. Since his election in 2016, President Duterte has demonized journalists,
labeling them spies and downplayed the assassination of reporters (Schmidt 2017).10
Unsurprisingly, Philippines’ score on V-Dem’s Freedom of expression and alternative
sources of information index has declined substantially from 0.90 in 2015 to 0.77 in 2018.
9A complete list of all 169 risk forecasts can be found in Table 7 in Appendix A
10Schmidt also quotes then-president elect Duterte saying “Just because youre a journalist you are not
exempted from assassination if youre a son of a bitch,” in 2016 just before his inauguration.
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Further, one outcome of President Duterte’s so-called war on drugs is a marked increase
in extra-judicial killings. This is reflected in a substantial and statistically significant
0.3-point decrease in V-Dem’s Physical Violence Index: It went from 0.58 in 2015 to 0.28
in 2018. President Duterte’s undermining of democracy include legislative constraints on
executive power. President Duterte’s governing Coalition for Change enjoys a majority in
the Senate (12 out of 24 seats) and a super majority in House of Representatives (258 out
of 297 seats) and V-Dem’s Legislative constraints on the executive index also decreased
substantially and statistically significantly from 0.76 in 2015 to 0.44 in 2018.
The developments in the Philippines in just these last three years are arguably fore-
boding. Our ensemble model accurately picks up on these as well as a range of other
tends in the data, producing a high estimated risk that the Philippines will become an
electoral autocracy in the next two years. Indeed, as of this writing, the Philippines have
not yet held their mid-term elections, which are scheduled for 13 May 2019. However,
some observes fear that these elections will help Duterte further consolidate his power
(Kishi & Raleigh 2019)
In Mali, a recent uptick in violence and the government’s failure to curb militia vio-
lence, led to the resignation of the entire Malian government in April (al Jazeera News
Agency 2019, Quashie-Idun & Swails 2019). In Guatemala, President Morales is taking
steps to oust supreme court justices who overturned his decision to expel the United
Nations-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, which has
a mandate to root-out corruption high-profile crimes in the country (Amnesty Interna-
tional 2019a, Eulich 2019). Endemic corruption, the erosion of judicial independence,
and human rights abuses have pushed people to the streets in protest and the country to
a breaking point.
The gradual, yet persistent erosion of democratic norms and institutions in Hungary
by Prime Minister Orba´n and his far-right Fidesz party has caused alarm bells to ring in
Brussels and through a number of European capitals (Foer 2019). Since taking office in
2010, Orba´n has worked to curtail judicial independence, erode legislative constrains on
the use of executive power, undermine political civil liberties, limit academic freedom, and
constrain the ability of civil society organizations to work freely in Hungary. Indeed, the
election and immediate actions of Orba´n in 2010 pushed Hungary from a promising liberal
democracy to an electoral democracy. And, according to V-Dem data, this downward
trend has continued unabated for the past ten years.
In Benin, the government recently shut down the internet and cracked down on protest
in the run-up to its elections in late April (Amnesty International 2019b, BBC 2019).
Further, new election laws in Benin limited the ability of opposition parties to get on
the ballet – both of the major parties on the April ballot were loyal the current regime.
Moreover, President Talon’s government has constrained political civil liberties, such as
the right to protest, over the last year. Coupled with the fact that violence erupted
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after the recent election and that the government is failing to address concerns over
the integrity of this election, it seems that Benin is creeping towards an adverse regime
transition.
The above descriptions are not to say that any of these cases will, with certainty,
experience an adverse regime transition in 2019 or 2020 only that the recent news coming
out of these countries is not promising. That said, there are a few countries within
the top 20 forecasts seem to be cases in which the current regime is influx; they are
bouncing between RoW classes as their political institutions are at the border of different
thresholds. As noted in the introduction, Albania is one of these cases; Mauritius and
Fiji are others. However, while Albania and Mauritius are examples of a burgeoning
liberal democracies that are struggling to solidify important liberalization reforms, Fiji
is newly minted electoral democracy with a long history of democratic advancements
followed closely by democratic erosion.
Within our sample, Fiji has experienced four ARTs (1987, 2000, 2007, and 2016).
V-Dem data suggest that the ART in 2016 was a product of a slight decrease in the
Electoral Democracy index. However, the three prior ARTs were all triggered by coups
and crackdowns on civil liberties. And, while the military nominally relinquished control
in 2015, they handed power over to Prime Minister Bainimarama, the head of the former
military regime and leader of the Fiji First party, which is considered to be loyal to the
military. In the 2018 elections, the Fiji First party saw its vote share decrease from
59.17 percent to 50.02 percent. Thus, there is concern that if support erodes further the
military might again stage a coup.
5 Conclusion
This a paper introduces the V-Forecast project, the Varieties of Democracy Institute’s
forecasting intuitive. The goal of this project is to develop a suite of forecasting models
focused specifically on democratic erosion and other phenomena related to democratic
governance. The aim is to make these forecasts easy to understand, transparent in con-
struction, and publicly available. The hope is that policy-makers, aid agencies, and
nongovernmental organizations will find these tools useful, and direct resources to at-
risk cases. Indeed, we hope that all relevant actors will use these tools to improve the
conditions in troubled countries, making our predictions wrong.
Although the current approach and model seem to be working well, two limitations
need to be highlighted. First, as the discussion above highlights, our current models
perform remarkably well. However, since this is the first iteration of live forecasts where
we predict into the actual future (as of the time the forecasts were created), these kinds
of accuracy assessments have to be based on retrospective test forecasts. We have to
pretend that we do not have information on ARTs and data which in fact we do already
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have. We did all this with the current, v9 version of V-Dem. The limitation in this,
and something that we cannot accurately recreate, is that we do not know whether the
underlying data will change as well.
During development of this forecasting system, which used both v8 and later v9
versions of V-Dem, it became apparent that due to an adjustment in some of the data
aggregations in V-Dem, and as well the inherent potential for retrospective changes in the
estimated V-Dem measurement model, the set of ARTs changed slightly but substantially
enough, given the nature of rare events, to negatively impact an attempt to assess v8
model and forecast performance with v9 outcome data. Essentially the target had shifted
from under the forecast. This is an unavoidable possibility that we cannot address, but
which could impact the future assessment of the current set of forecasts in early 2021.
The other limitation is due to the operationalization of ARTs with the categorical
regime of the world indicator. We define an ART as a movement from a higher category
to any lower category. Although conceptually ARTs should be significant movements
of a regime towards increased authoritarianism, with our current operationalization we
cannot distinguish these from instances where a country was already close to the next
RoW category experienced a relatively small movement that pushed it across the category
boundary. This means that some of the cases of ARTs identified in our data could be
relatively small changes in one of the indicators used to construct the RoW categorization.
Moving forward, we plan to expand the scope of this project by developing a series
of thematic forecasting models that can estimate the risk that there will be a significant
decline in anyone of six dimensions of democracy: (1) elections, (2) civil society, (3)
freedom of expression and media, (4) public corruption, (5) democratic inclusion, and (6)
legislative and judicial constraints on the use of executive power. Further, we are going
to develop a forecasting model that can estimate the risk of state-based electoral violence
and intimidation.
By diversifying our forecast targets to include a number of different dimensions of
democracy, we can provide policy-makers and aid agencies a suite tools for identifying
which specific democratic institutions are at greater risk of erosion, so that they can
direct resources accordingly.
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A Appendix: List of 2019-2020 forecasts for the risk
of ART
Table 7: List of complete 2019-2020 ART risk forecasts
Country Estimated RoW Year since
Name Risk Classification last ART
1 Philippines 0.460 Electoral Democracy 14
2 Fiji 0.265 Electoral Democracy 2
3 Mali 0.254 Electoral Democracy 6
4 Hungary 0.250 Electoral Democracy 8
5 Guatemala 0.249 Electoral Democracy 35
6 Kosovo 0.228 Electoral Democracy 6
7 Kyrgyzstan 0.217 Electoral Democracy 2
8 Moldova 0.200 Electoral Democracy 10
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.193 Electoral Democracy 26
10 Tanzania 0.182 Electoral Democracy 2
11 Albania 0.170 Liberal Democracy 1
12 Benin 0.164 Liberal Democracy 3
13 The Gambia 0.143 Electoral Democracy 23
14 Czech Republic 0.129 Liberal Democracy 79
15 Italy 0.126 Liberal Democracy 94
16 Nicaragua 0.122 Electoral Autocracy 11
17 Mauritius 0.120 Liberal Democracy 1
18 Slovenia 0.115 Liberal Democracy 29
19 Turkmenistan 0.106 Electoral Autocracy 6
20 Ghana 0.106 Liberal Democracy 3
21 Comoros 0.104 Electoral Autocracy 3
22 Israel 0.103 Liberal Democracy 8
23 Niger 0.100 Electoral Democracy 8
24 Colombia 0.098 Electoral Democracy 34
25 France 0.096 Liberal Democracy 78
26 Lesotho 0.094 Electoral Democracy 1
27 Haiti 0.092 Electoral Autocracy 13
28 Armenia 0.091 Electoral Autocracy 23
29 Barbados 0.090 Liberal Democracy 118
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Table 7: List of complete 2019–2020 ART risk forecasts (continued)
Country Estimated RoW Year since
Name Risk Classification last ART
30 Romania 0.086 Electoral Democracy 118
31 Tunisia 0.085 Electoral Democracy 0
32 Somalia 0.085 Closed Autocracy 34
33 Latvia 0.084 Liberal Democracy 29
34 Afghanistan 0.082 Electoral Autocracy 44
35 Chile 0.080 Electoral Democracy 0
36 Burundi 0.077 Electoral Autocracy 22
37 Nepal 0.075 Electoral Democracy 6
38 Pakistan 0.074 Electoral Autocracy 5
39 Guinea-Bissau 0.074 Electoral Autocracy 0
40 Togo 0.074 Electoral Autocracy 1
41 Bhutan 0.073 Liberal Democracy 118
42 Greece 0.071 Electoral Democracy 0
43 Kenya 0.071 Electoral Autocracy 1
44 Lebanon 0.070 Electoral Autocracy 0
45 Macedonia 0.069 Electoral Democracy 6
46 Venezuela 0.069 Electoral Autocracy 12
47 Namibia 0.069 Electoral Democracy 1
48 Central African Republic 0.069 Electoral Autocracy 14
49 Zimbabwe 0.068 Electoral Autocracy 40
50 Costa Rica 0.068 Liberal Democracy 69
51 Timor-Leste 0.067 Electoral Democracy 118
52 Georgia 0.065 Electoral Democracy 28
53 Sudan 0.064 Electoral Autocracy 28
54 Poland 0.063 Electoral Democracy 3
55 Liberia 0.063 Electoral Democracy 14
56 Madagascar 0.063 Electoral Autocracy 8
57 Guinea 0.062 Electoral Autocracy 9
58 Burkina Faso 0.062 Electoral Democracy 3
59 Malaysia 0.062 Electoral Autocracy 48
60 Malawi 0.061 Electoral Democracy 14
61 Uruguay 0.060 Liberal Democracy 45
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Table 7: List of complete 2019–2020 ART risk forecasts (continued)
Country Estimated RoW Year since
Name Risk Classification last ART
62 Montenegro 0.060 Electoral Autocracy 2
63 South Korea 0.060 Electoral Democracy 0
64 El Salvador 0.056 Electoral Democracy 21
65 India 0.056 Electoral Democracy 43
66 Gabon 0.056 Electoral Autocracy 53
67 Ivory Coast 0.056 Electoral Democracy 4
68 Bolivia 0.055 Electoral Democracy 37
69 Bangladesh 0.055 Electoral Autocracy 6
70 Paraguay 0.054 Electoral Democracy 70
71 Burma/Myanmar 0.054 Electoral Autocracy 56
72 Cape Verde 0.052 Electoral Democracy 0
73 Uganda 0.049 Electoral Autocracy 24
74 Suriname 0.049 Electoral Democracy 38
75 Mozambique 0.047 Electoral Autocracy 44
76 Sri Lanka 0.047 Electoral Democracy 13
77 Nigeria 0.047 Electoral Democracy 15
78 Sierra Leone 0.047 Electoral Democracy 20
79 Turkey 0.047 Electoral Autocracy 5
80 Indonesia 0.046 Electoral Democracy 57
81 Trinidad and Tobago 0.044 Liberal Democracy 118
82 Serbia 0.044 Electoral Autocracy 3
83 Iran 0.043 Electoral Autocracy 118
84 Mauritania 0.042 Electoral Autocracy 10
85 Maldives 0.042 Electoral Autocracy 5
86 Cameroon 0.042 Electoral Autocracy 57
87 Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.041 Electoral Autocracy 53
88 South Africa 0.041 Electoral Democracy 5
89 Panama 0.041 Electoral Democracy 49
90 Botswana 0.041 Electoral Democracy 1
91 Chad 0.040 Electoral Autocracy 49
92 Ecuador 0.040 Electoral Democracy 46
93 Singapore 0.040 Electoral Autocracy 118
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Table 7: List of complete 2019–2020 ART risk forecasts (continued)
Country Estimated RoW Year since
Name Risk Classification last ART
94 Peru 0.039 Electoral Democracy 26
95 Ukraine 0.039 Electoral Autocracy 6
96 Brazil 0.038 Electoral Democracy 53
97 Azerbaijan 0.038 Electoral Autocracy 28
98 Solomon Islands 0.038 Electoral Democracy 12
99 Guyana 0.038 Electoral Democracy 118
100 Libya 0.038 Closed Autocracy 4
101 Iraq 0.037 Electoral Autocracy 8
102 Croatia 0.037 Electoral Democracy 19
103 Tajikistan 0.037 Electoral Autocracy 28
104 Lithuania 0.037 Electoral Democracy 2
105 Honduras 0.037 Electoral Autocracy 9
106 Ethiopia 0.036 Electoral Autocracy 118
107 Mexico 0.036 Electoral Democracy 118
108 Slovakia 0.036 Electoral Democracy 5
109 Papua New Guinea 0.035 Electoral Autocracy 26
110 Kazakhstan 0.034 Electoral Autocracy 28
111 Dominican Republic 0.034 Electoral Democracy 28
112 Republic of the Congo 0.033 Electoral Autocracy 21
113 Vietnam 0.032 Closed Autocracy 2
114 Zambia 0.032 Electoral Autocracy 3
115 Bulgaria 0.032 Electoral Democracy 69
116 Senegal 0.031 Electoral Democracy 36
117 Cyprus 0.030 Liberal Democracy 49
118 Egypt 0.029 Electoral Autocracy 5
119 Morocco 0.029 Closed Autocracy 118
120 Angola 0.029 Electoral Autocracy 25
121 Finland 0.028 Liberal Democracy 118
122 Mongolia 0.027 Electoral Democracy 107
123 Jamaica 0.026 Electoral Democracy 37
124 Equatorial Guinea 0.025 Electoral Autocracy 39
125 United States of America 0.025 Liberal Democracy 118
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Table 7: List of complete 2019–2020 ART risk forecasts (continued)
Country Estimated RoW Year since
Name Risk Classification last ART
126 Sweden 0.024 Liberal Democracy 118
127 Austria 0.024 Liberal Democracy 84
128 Taiwan 0.023 Liberal Democracy 8
129 Rwanda 0.023 Electoral Autocracy 44
130 Argentina 0.022 Electoral Democracy 41
131 Cambodia 0.022 Electoral Autocracy 45
132 Belarus 0.022 Electoral Autocracy 21
133 New Zealand 0.021 Liberal Democracy 118
134 South Sudan 0.021 Closed Autocracy 7
135 Canada 0.020 Liberal Democracy 118
136 Djibouti 0.020 Electoral Autocracy 36
137 Portugal 0.020 Liberal Democracy 57
138 Estonia 0.019 Liberal Democracy 26
139 Ireland 0.017 Liberal Democracy 99
140 Russia 0.017 Electoral Autocracy 22
141 United Kingdom 0.016 Liberal Democracy 118
142 Japan 0.015 Liberal Democracy 118
143 Algeria 0.015 Electoral Autocracy 52
144 Thailand 0.013 Closed Autocracy 4
145 Belgium 0.013 Liberal Democracy 78
146 Netherlands 0.012 Liberal Democracy 78
147 Qatar 0.012 Closed Autocracy 118
148 Spain 0.011 Liberal Democracy 79
149 Swaziland 0.011 Closed Autocracy 118
150 Iceland 0.011 Liberal Democracy 88
151 North Korea 0.011 Closed Autocracy 73
152 Germany 0.010 Liberal Democracy 84
153 Jordan 0.010 Closed Autocracy 65
154 Norway 0.010 Liberal Democracy 76
155 Switzerland 0.010 Liberal Democracy 118
156 Denmark 0.010 Liberal Democracy 75
157 Australia 0.009 Liberal Democracy 102
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Table 7: List of complete 2019–2020 ART risk forecasts (continued)
Country Estimated RoW Year since
Name Risk Classification last ART
158 Uzbekistan 0.009 Closed Autocracy 27
159 Yemen 0.009 Closed Autocracy 2
160 Eritrea 0.007 Closed Autocracy 118
161 Cuba 0.007 Closed Autocracy 58
162 Laos 0.006 Closed Autocracy 27
163 Kuwait 0.006 Closed Autocracy 118
164 Oman 0.006 Closed Autocracy 118
165 Syria 0.006 Closed Autocracy 5
166 Luxembourg 0.006 Liberal Democracy 78
167 China 0.005 Closed Autocracy 97
168 United Arab Emirates 0.004 Closed Autocracy 47
169 Saudi Arabia 0.003 Closed Autocracy 49
B Appendix: Nontechnical overview of machine learn-
ing methods
For our unweighted model average ensemble, we use the estimates from three machine
learning models: logit with elastic-net regularization, random forest, and gradient boosted
forest. As their names imply, logit with elastic-net regularization models are built around
maximum-likelihood principles, while random forest and gradient boosted forest start
with decision trees. Below, we provide an overview of these machines learning methods.
Logit w/elastic-net regulation: Like standard logistic regression, the elastic-net reg-
ularization (ENR) version estimates coefficients for a linear equation relating input co-
variates to the binary outcome variable through a logistic function. In addition to the
regular logistic likelihood, the cost function for elastic net regression includes a penalty
term for non-zero coefficient values. This penalty term is governed by two hyperparame-
ters and has the practical effect of pushing some coefficient estimates completely to zero,
and shrinking the remaining coefficient estimates towards zero.
The ENR model works well with variables that are highly correlated (provides different
weights to highly correlated variables according to how much variation the variable ex-
plains, allowing uninformative variables to go to zero), helps reduce model-fit (introduces
bias to the training model in order to produce more accurate out-of-sample predictions),
and provides a heuristic for variable selection (orders variables according to post-weighted
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parameter estimates and identifies which parameter went to zero). Introduced by Zou &
Hastie (2005), this algorithm has become a mainstay in the machine learning discipline.
Within the social sciences, the Early Warning Project uses this method to forecast mass
killings (Woocher et al. 2018).
Random Forest & Gradient Boosted Forest: Decision trees are at the root of
both the random forest and gradient boosted forest algorithms. Decision tree algorithms
start by measuring how well each variable, at different cut-points, classifies observations
according to the outcome variable, selecting the cut-point that performs best. The algo-
rithm does this for all variables and determines which variable, and at what cut-point,
best explains the outcome variable. This variable becomes a root node. The algorithm
splits all of the observations according to the root node cut-point, branching out to create
two (or more) sub-nodes. At each sub-node, the algorithm again assesses which of the re-
maining variables, and at what value, best classifies the data in each sub-node. It repeats
this process to the point in which new nodes (splits) no longer improve classification.
With their introduction and formalization by Quinlan (1979), decision tree-based ap-
proaches serve as the foundation of many modern machine learning algorithms (Laurent
& Rivest 1976, Quinlan 1986, 1987, Rivest 1987, Rokach 2016). However, while deci-
sion trees do well at describing the data at hand, overfitting reduces their out-of-sample
accuracy.
First introduced by Ho (1995, 1998) and extended by Breiman (2001), the random
forest (RF) algorithm helps address this overfitting issue. To do so, the RF algorithm
introduces two randomization techniques. First, it draws a bootstrapped (with replace-
ment) dataset and grows a decision tree. However, rather than assessing how well all
variables perform at each node, the RF algorithm randomly selects m number of vari-
ables for consideration. It repeats this process hundreds of times, growing a forest of
diverse decision trees, each with a unique set of variables at each node. The observations
excluded from the bootstrapped sample are fed into each randomized tree for classifica-
tion. The algorithm calculates the average classification from these trees and records it as
the probability the observation belongs in a specific class, whether there was an adverse
regime transition, for example. These predictions are then compared to the observed
value of the outcome variable.
Introduced by Breiman (1996), this bootstrap aggregation process (also known as
“bagging”) reduces issues related to model fit as well as a model’s variance – how far the
predicted value deviates from the observed value. This out-of-sample error (the mean
prediction error) is an important metric for model tuning – determining the optimum
number of variables, m, to use as well as the number of trees to grow. Since its introduc-
tion, the RF method has quickly become one of the most widely used machine learning
algorithms (Rokach 2016). This is one of the primary methods Hegre et al. (2019) at the
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ViEWS project use to predict various types of political violence.
Like the RF algorithm, the gradient boosted forest (GBF) algorithm first draws a
bootstrapped sample (with replacement) and grows a decision tree. Unlike the RF method
that builds and combines a forest of randomly different trees in parallel, the GBF algo-
rithm builds a series of trees, where each successive tree is trained so that it attempts
to reduce the predictive error of the previous trees. Further, while the RF algorithm
grows trees using m number of variables at each node, the GBF method uses the entire
variable set at each node split. However, it restricts the number of nodes (splits) within
each decision tree, usually between one and ten nodes, growing what researchers refer to
as “weak learners” or “shallow trees.” The algorithm calculates the residuals using the
bootstrapped data. It then fits another shallow tree to these residuals. The algorithm
combines the two decision trees, runs the observed data through this ensemble of trees,
calculates the residuals, and fits a new tree to these residuals. It then combines this tree
with the others, repeating this recursive learning process hundreds of times, growing a
forest of dependent decision trees. Thus, the GBF method has four parameters that affect
the model’s performance: the number of trees to grow, the number of nodes to allow,
and two parameters that regulate how much each successive tree should “learn” (Rokach
2016).
The gradient boosted method was first introduced in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s
as a way to improve the predictive (and classification) power of other decision tree models
(Freund & Schapire 1997, Friedman 2001, 2002, Mason et al. 2000, Rokach 2016). This
method has grown in use throughout other disciplines; in fact, Wu et al. (2008) regard
model boosting algorithms to be one of the top-ten tools for practical machine learning
problems. Nevertheless, while Gohdes (2019) uses the GBF method for a classification
problem looking at the relationship between internet accessibility and the type and target
of political violence in Syria, to our knowledge, we are the first to adapt this approach
to a forecasting problem centered around distinct political phenomenon.
Tuning of Model Hyperparameters: We optimized the hyperparameters for all of
our machine learning models to maximize out-of-sample fit, with estimates obtained
through a model tuning cross-validation procedure. Note that this cross-validation is
nested within the top-level 2×7-fold cross-validation scheme we use to assess out-of-
sample fit and model evaluation. In short, for each iteration of the top-level cross-
validation, we take the current training data set and perform an additional round of
model-level cross-validation in order to optimize the hyperparameters.
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C Appendix: Performance for ensemble sub-models
C.1 Yearly test forecasts
The plots below help provide a sense of how well each of our models are preforming across
a series of yearly test forecasts (2011-17). Throughout these plots, light purple denotes
country-year observations without an ART, blue denotes an observation that experienced
an ART in the first year of the two-year window, while dark purple denotes observations
with an ART in the last year of the two-year window. For example, the figure below
shows the risk estimates our ensemble model generated for 2011-12. After training the
model with data from 1970 to 2009, we use data from 2010 to calculate the country-level
risk of ARTs for 2011-12.
Figure 6: Ensemble: 2011-2012 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.153;  Brier: 0.042;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 7: Ensemble: 2012-2013 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.513;  Brier: 0.076;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 8: Ensemble: 2013-2014 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.408;  Brier: 0.046;  Kappa: 0.158
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Figure 9: Ensemble: 2014-2015 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.228;  Brier: 0.048;  Kappa: 0.173
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Figure 10: Ensemble: 2015-2016 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.299;  Brier: 0.072;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 11: Ensemble: 2016-2017 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.489;  Brier: 0.065;  Kappa: 0.219
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Figure 12: Ensemble: 2017-2018 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.372;  Brier: 0.064;  Kappa: 0.124
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Figure 13: Ensemble: 2019-2020 Forecast
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Figure 14: Logit w/elastic-net regularization: 2011-2012 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.184;  Brier: 0.042;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 15: Logit w/elastic-net regularization: 2012-2013 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.296;  Brier: 0.083;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 16: Logit w/elastic-net regularization: 2013-2014 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.241;  Brier: 0.052;  Kappa: 0.158
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Figure 17: Logit w/elastic-net regularization: 2014-2015 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.212;  Brier: 0.053;  Kappa: 0.288
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Figure 18: Logit w/elastic-net regularization: 2015-2016 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.256;  Brier: 0.073;  Kappa: 0.115
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Figure 19: Logit w/elastic-net regularization: 2016-2017 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.313;  Brier: 0.075;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 20: Logit w/elastic-net regularization: 2017-2018 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.268;  Brier: 0.073;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 21: Logit w/elastic-net regularization: 2019-2020 Forecast
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Figure 22: Random forest: 2011-2012 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.132;  Brier: 0.043;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 23: Random forest: 2012-2013 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.524;  Brier: 0.068;  Kappa: 0.193
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Figure 24: Random forest: 2013-2014 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.484;  Brier: 0.042;  Kappa: 0.118
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Figure 25: Random forest: 2014-2015 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.309;  Brier: 0.056;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 26: Random forest: 2015-2016 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.292;  Brier: 0.074;  Kappa: −0.011
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Figure 27: Random forest: 2016-2017 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.503;  Brier: 0.061;  Kappa: 0
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
169
156
143
130
117
104
91
78
65
52
39
26
13
1
All Observations
R
an
ke
d 
Ri
sk
Observed Onsets w/in 1 Year: 8
Observed Onsets w/in 2 Years: 15
Highest Predicted Risk: 49%
Acceptance Threshold: 5%
Precision − TP/(TP+FP): 0.192
Recall − TP/(TP+FN): 0.933
True Positive: 14
True Negative: 95
False Positive: 59
False Negative: 1
20: Chile
19: Nepal
18: Togo
17: Portugal
16: Pakistan
15: Mali
14: Burkina Faso
13: India
12: Comoros
11: Sri Lanka
10: Latvia
9: Burundi
8: Lebanon
7: Fiji
6: Tanzania
5: Moldova
4: Vietnam
3: Kyrgyzstan
2: Yemen
1: Montenegro
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Top 20 Countries
Observed Onset in 2016
Observed Onset in 2017
Figure 28: Random forest: 2017-2018 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.343;  Brier: 0.065;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 29: Random forest: 2019-2020 Forecast
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Figure 30: Gradient boosted forest: 2011-2012 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.12;  Brier: 0.047;  Kappa: −0.011
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Figure 31: Gradient boosted forest: 2012-2013 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.447;  Brier: 0.081;  Kappa: 0.101
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Figure 32: Gradient boosted forest: 2013-2014 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.348;  Brier: 0.049;  Kappa: 0.378
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Figure 33: Gradient boosted forest: 2014-2015 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.213;  Brier: 0.051;  Kappa: 0.173
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Figure 34: Gradient boosted forest: 2015-2016 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.338;  Brier: 0.071;  Kappa: 0
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Figure 35: Gradient boosted forest: 2016-2017 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.513;  Brier: 0.065;  Kappa: 0.199
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Figure 36: Gradient boosted forest: 2017-2018 Test Forecast
AUC−PR: 0.338;  Brier: 0.062;  Kappa: 0.212
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Figure 37: Gradient boosted forest: 2019-2020 Forecast
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D Appendix: Adverse Regime Transitions
The tables below lists the 189 adverse regime transitions that are captured in our data
by year. They provide the RoW classification before and after the ART event as well as
the year that the event manifested.
Table 8: Adverse Regime Transitions – 1970-2018
Country RoW Classification RoW Classification Year of
Name before ART after ART ART
1 Bolivia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1970
2 Malaysia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1970
3 Somalia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1970
4 Cambodia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1971
5 Lesotho Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1971
6 Ecuador Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1972
7 Madagascar Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1972
8 Philippines Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1972
9 Uruguay Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1972
10 Cambodia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1973
11 Chile Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1973
12 Ghana Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1973
13 Honduras Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1973
14 Uruguay Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1973
15 Afghanistan Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1974
16 Chile Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1974
17 Jamaica Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1974
18 Nicaragua Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1974
19 Rwanda Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1974
20 Tunisia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1974
21 Bangladesh Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1975
22 India Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1975
23 Laos Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1975
24 Argentina Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1976
25 Cape Verde Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1976
26 Israel Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 1976
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Table 8: Adverse Regime Transitions – 1970-2018 (cont.)
Country RoW Classification RoW Classification Year
Name before ART after ART of ART
27 Argentina Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1977
28 Colombia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1977
29 Sudan Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1977
30 Thailand Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1977
31 Vietnam Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1977
32 Comoros Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1978
33 Malawi Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1978
34 Pakistan Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1978
35 The Gambia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1978
36 Zimbabwe Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1978
37 Equatorial Guinea Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1979
38 El Salvador Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1980
39 Suriname Electoral Democracy Closed Autocracy 1980
40 Turkey Electoral Democracy Closed Autocracy 1980
41 Bolivia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1981
42 Burkina Faso Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1981
43 Ghana Electoral Democracy Closed Autocracy 1981
44 Jamaica Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1981
45 Philippines Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1981
46 Solomon Islands Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1981
47 Djibouti Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1982
48 Senegal Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1982
49 Bangladesh Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1983
50 Guatemala Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1983
51 Colombia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1984
52 Nigeria Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1984
53 Somalia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1984
54 South Africa Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1985
55 Sudan Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1985
56 Uganda Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1985
57 Fiji Electoral Democracy Closed Autocracy 1987
58 Malawi Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1987
59 Burundi Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1988
60 Haiti Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1989
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Table 8: Adverse Regime Transitions – 1970-2018 (cont.)
Country RoW Classification RoW Classification Year of
Name before ART after ART ART
61 Dominican Republic Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1990
62 Liberia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1990
63 Solomon Islands Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1990
64 Sudan Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1990
65 The Gambia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1990
66 Laos Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1991
67 Thailand Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1991
68 Estonia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1992
69 Haiti Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1992
70 Papua New Guinea Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1992
71 Peru Electoral Democracy Closed Autocracy 1992
72 Angola Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1993
73 Sierra Leone Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1993
74 Nigeria Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1994
75 Uganda Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1994
76 Armenia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1995
77 Lesotho Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1995
78 The Gambia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1995
79 Burundi Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1996
80 Niger Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1996
81 Russia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1996
82 Belarus Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1997
83 El Salvador Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1997
84 Republic of the Congo Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1997
85 Zambia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1997
86 Sierra Leone Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1998
87 Ukraine Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1998
88 Burkina Faso Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1999
89 Croatia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 1999
90 Lesotho Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1999
91 Pakistan Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 1999
92 Comoros Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2000
93 Fiji Electoral Democracy Closed Autocracy 2000
94 Iraq Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2000
95 Macedonia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2000
96 Solomon Islands Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2000
97 Thailand Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2000
52
Table 8: Adverse Regime Transitions – 1970-2018 (cont.)
Country RoW Classification RoW Classification Year of
Name before ART after ART ART
98 Madagascar Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2001
99 Tanzania Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2001
100 Nepal Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2002
101 Burkina Faso Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2003
102 Nigeria Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2003
103 Central African Republic Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2004
104 Liberia Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2004
105 Malawi Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2004
106 Philippines Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2004
107 Haiti Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2005
108 Kosovo Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2005
109 Moldova Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2005
110 Sri Lanka Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2005
111 Zambia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2005
112 Bangladesh Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2006
113 Hungary Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2006
114 Mauritania Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2006
115 Montenegro Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2006
116 Solomon Islands Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2006
117 Thailand Electoral Democracy Closed Autocracy 2006
118 Venezuela Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2006
119 Bangladesh Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2007
120 Fiji Electoral Democracy Closed Autocracy 2007
121 Nicaragua Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2007
122 South Africa Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2007
123 Guinea-Bissau Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2008
124 Madagascar Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2008
125 Mauritania Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2008
126 Moldova Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2008
127 Guinea Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2009
128 Honduras Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2009
129 Niger Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2009
130 Tanzania Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2009
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Table 8: Adverse Regime Transitions – 1970-2018 (cont.)
Country RoW Classification RoW Classification Year of
Name before ART after ART ART
131 Guinea-Bissau Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2010
132 Hungary Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2010
133 Iraq Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2010
134 Israel Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2010
135 Lebanon Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2010
136 Madagascar Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2010
137 Montenegro Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2010
138 Niger Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2010
139 Taiwan Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2010
140 Togo Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2010
141 Bangladesh Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2012
142 Kosovo Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2012
143 Macedonia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2012
144 Mali Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2012
145 Namibia Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2012
146 Nepal Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2012
147 Turkmenistan Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2012
148 Ukraine Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2012
149 Egypt Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2013
150 Guinea-Bissau Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2013
151 Maldives Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2013
152 Pakistan Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2013
153 Slovakia Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2013
154 South Africa Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2013
155 Syria Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2013
156 Thailand Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2013
157 Turkey Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2013
158 Ivory Coast Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2014
159 Libya Electoral Democracy Closed Autocracy 2014
160 Thailand Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2014
161 Benin Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2015
162 Burkina Faso Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2015
163 Comoros Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2015
164 Ghana Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2015
165 Poland Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2015
166 Serbia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2015
167 Zambia Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2015
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Table 8: Adverse Regime Transitions – 1970-2018 (cont.)
Country RoW Classification RoW Classification Year of
Name before ART after ART ART
168 Fiji Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2016
169 Kyrgyzstan Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2016
170 Latvia Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2016
171 Lithuania Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2016
172 Montenegro Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2016
173 Tanzania Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2016
174 Vietnam Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2016
175 Yemen Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy 2016
176 Albania Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2017
177 Botswana Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2017
178 Kenya Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2017
179 Lesotho Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2017
180 Mauritius Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2017
181 Namibia Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2017
182 Togo Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2017
183 Cape Verde Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2018
184 Chile Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2018
185 Greece Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2018
186 Guinea-Bissau Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2018
187 Lebanon Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy 2018
188 South Korea Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2018
189 Tunisia Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy 2018
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E Appendix: Data Description
The table below provides a list of all of the variables we use in our various models. Most
variable names are simply the variable tag from the V-Dem data set. Please see the
V-Dem code book for a full description of these variables. The other variable names are
self explanatory. This table also provides basic descriptive statistics: the minimum and
maximum value, the mean, and the standard deviation of each variable in our sample.
Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Min Max Mean SD
is closed autocracy 0 1 0.306 0.461
currentRegimeDuration 1 118 26.417 28.042
low border case 0 1 0.139 0.346
high border case 0 1 0.113 0.316
yrs since any neg change 0 117 40.521 34.302
num of neg changes 0 10 1.369 1.642
any neg change 0 1 0.024 0.154
num of neg changes 3yrs 0 2 0.072 0.266
num of neg changes 5yrs 0 2 0.120 0.345
num of neg changes 10yrs 0 3 0.232 0.496
was neg change last 3yrs 0 1 0.070 0.254
was neg change last 5yrs 0 1 0.113 0.316
was neg change last 10yrs 0 1 0.200 0.400
v2x regime.0 0 1 0.306 0.461
v2x regime.1 0 1 0.278 0.448
v2x regime.2 0 1 0.208 0.406
v2x regime.3 0 1 0.208 0.406
v2x regime amb.0 0 1 0.267 0.442
v2x regime amb.1 0 1 0.040 0.195
v2x regime amb.2 0 1 0.029 0.169
v2x regime amb.3 0 1 0.212 0.409
v2x regime amb.4 0 1 0.037 0.188
v2x regime amb.5 0 1 0.049 0.217
v2x regime amb.6 0 1 0.123 0.328
v2x regime amb.7 0 1 0.036 0.187
v2x regime amb.8 0 1 0.060 0.238
v2x regime amb.9 0 1 0.147 0.354
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
is leg 0 1 0.912 0.284
is elec 0 1 0.854 0.353
is election year 0 1 0.261 0.439
v2elrgstry -3.967 2.872 0.286 1.313
v2elvotbuy -2.989 3.400 0.033 1.351
v2elirreg -3.081 3.109 0.041 1.369
v2elintim -4.037 3.445 -0.055 1.458
v2elpeace -4.578 2.550 0.121 1.302
v2elfrfair -3.410 2.883 -0.037 1.527
v2elmulpar -3.534 2.538 0.080 1.476
v2elboycot -4.317 1.927 0.078 1.228
v2elaccept -3.805 2.687 -0.062 1.362
v2elasmoff -6.669 0.885 -0.076 1.066
v2eldonate -2.561 3.895 -0.227 1.332
v2elpubfin -2.586 3.770 -0.025 1.451
v2ellocons 0 59 8.052 8.907
v2ellocumul 0 59 14.617 10.428
v2elprescons 0 30 2.673 4.326
v2elprescumul 0 36 4.807 6.696
v2elpaidig -2.580 3.161 0.056 1.328
v2elfrcamp -2.241 2.946 0.346 1.360
v2elpdcamp -2.727 3.385 0.058 1.391
v2elmonref 0 1 0.029 0.168
v2elmonden 0 1 0.025 0.156
v2x polyarchy 0.010 0.948 0.447 0.290
v2x freexp altinf 0.012 0.990 0.569 0.331
v2x frassoc thick 0.019 0.957 0.547 0.340
v2xel frefair 0 0.993 0.469 0.347
v2x elecoff 0 1 0.762 0.411
v2x liberal 0.004 0.985 0.534 0.292
v2xcl rol 0 0.994 0.602 0.300
v2x jucon 0.003 0.991 0.534 0.310
v2xlg legcon 0 0.984 0.470 0.345
v2x partip 0.018 0.887 0.408 0.207
v2x cspart 0.021 0.989 0.575 0.283
v2xdl delib 0.009 0.988 0.555 0.300
v2x egal 0.054 0.983 0.588 0.227
v2xeg eqprotec 0.011 0.992 0.611 0.258
v2xeg eqaccess 0.025 0.991 0.580 0.246
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
v2xeg eqdr 0.010 0.985 0.578 0.283
v2elembaut -2.642 3.818 0.311 1.706
v2elembcap -3.002 3.654 0.415 1.488
v2elreggov 0 1 0.778 0.416
v2ellocgov 0 1 0.958 0.200
v2elrsthos 0 1 0.879 0.326
v2elrstrct 0 1 0.905 0.293
v2psparban -3.700 2.891 0.265 1.792
v2psbars -3.735 3.091 0.476 1.708
v2psoppaut -3.542 3.534 0.369 1.944
v2psorgs -3.097 3.213 0.671 1.405
v2psprbrch -3.191 3.545 0.658 1.369
v2psprlnks -3.205 3.509 0.113 1.382
v2psplats -3.163 3.349 0.379 1.635
v2pscnslnl -2.685 4.606 0.140 1.357
v2pscohesv -3.690 2.557 0.691 1.219
v2pscomprg -3.467 2.582 0.457 1.199
v2psnatpar -2.772 3.017 0.125 1.415
v2pssunpar -2.751 2.798 -0.010 1.594
v2exremhsp -2.495 4.164 -0.315 1.199
v2exdfdshs -3.490 3.029 -0.178 1.502
v2exdfcbhs -3.377 2.456 0.184 1.497
v2exdfvths -3.396 2.525 -0.091 1.496
v2exdfdmhs -3.281 2.402 0.159 1.637
v2exdfpphs -2.553 3.328 0.327 1.477
v2exhoshog 0 1 0.399 0.490
v2exrescon -3.223 3.476 0.293 1.429
v2exbribe -3.142 3.607 0.012 1.537
v2exembez -3.232 3.570 0.050 1.544
v2excrptps -3.074 4.005 -0.150 1.505
v2exthftps -3.142 3.712 0.049 1.518
v2ex elechos 0 1 0.460 0.498
v2ex hogw 0 1 0.381 0.471
v2expathhs 0 8 5.208 2.380
v2lgbicam 0 2 1.251 0.604
v2lgqstexp -2.336 2.320 0.248 1.336
v2lginvstp -2.939 3.844 0.217 1.481
v2lgotovst -2.974 3.124 0.181 1.397
v2lgcrrpt -3.284 3.322 -0.087 1.321
v2lgoppart -2.528 3.507 0.285 1.582
v2lgfunds -2.427 2.418 0.214 1.291
v2lgdsadlobin -9.368 0.605 -0.063 0.975
v2lglegplo -3.778 1.963 0.352 1.196
v2lgcomslo -3.627 3.742 0.632 1.097
v2lgsrvlo -2.213 2.154 -0.051 1.361
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
v2ex hosw 0 1 0.619 0.471
v2lgamend 0 1 0.426 0.495
v2dlreason -2.911 3.716 0.439 1.347
v2dlcommon -3.568 2.858 0.409 1.188
v2dlcountr -3.359 3.548 0.201 1.435
v2dlconslt -3.051 4.455 0.555 1.414
v2dlengage -3.123 3.457 0.460 1.426
v2dlencmps -3.452 3.438 0.545 1.238
v2dlunivl -3.289 3.407 0.661 1.142
v2jureform -3.607 3.398 0.024 1.167
v2jupurge -3.830 2.847 0.427 1.262
v2jupoatck -4.449 3.048 0.334 1.230
v2jupack -4.454 1.710 -0.056 1.242
v2juaccnt -3.087 3.642 0.495 1.278
v2jucorrdc -3.161 3.290 0.043 1.512
v2juhcind -3.205 3.471 0.100 1.469
v2juncind -3.375 3.359 0.259 1.470
v2juhccomp -3.910 2.875 0.281 1.468
v2jucomp -3.458 3.264 0.206 1.471
v2jureview -2.719 1.842 0.180 1.241
v2clacfree -3.506 3.798 0.617 1.669
v2clrelig -3.929 2.798 0.632 1.468
v2cltort -3.067 3.658 0.388 1.631
v2clkill -3.511 3.514 0.638 1.667
v2cltrnslw -3.730 4.170 0.476 1.534
v2clrspct -3.685 4.455 0.202 1.512
v2clfmove -4.206 2.949 0.645 1.474
v2cldmovem -5.016 2.689 0.745 1.288
v2cldmovew -4.756 3.238 0.696 1.402
v2cldiscm -3.781 3.880 0.508 1.681
v2cldiscw -3.534 3.500 0.493 1.582
v2clslavem -4.100 3.033 0.883 1.130
v2clslavef -4.281 2.973 0.682 1.119
v2clstown -4.197 3.295 0.107 1.365
v2clprptym -4.398 2.425 0.643 1.267
v2clprptyw -3.750 2.822 0.609 1.337
v2clacjstm -4.056 3.896 0.546 1.476
v2clacjstw -3.974 3.722 0.492 1.466
v2clacjust -2.897 3.594 0.836 1.197
v2clsocgrp -2.996 3.102 0.526 1.305
v2clrgunev -2.942 2.794 0.347 1.301
v2svdomaut -3.254 2.169 1.036 0.730
v2svinlaut -3.147 2.733 1.097 0.769
v2svstterr 33.750 100 91.271 10.554
v2cseeorgs -3.226 3.548 0.498 1.592
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
v2csreprss -3.729 3.379 0.504 1.628
v2cscnsult -2.454 3.848 0.400 1.476
v2csprtcpt -3.532 3.263 0.333 1.470
v2csgender -3.499 3.238 0.788 1.087
v2csantimv -2.973 4.015 -0.515 1.265
v2csrlgrep -4.121 2.885 0.579 1.455
v2csrlgcon -2.854 3.054 0.159 1.335
v2mecenefm -3.089 3.569 0.220 1.671
v2mecrit -3.314 3.595 0.347 1.698
v2merange -3.111 3.171 0.285 1.629
v2meharjrn -3.088 3.985 0.284 1.628
v2meslfcen -3.241 3.268 0.211 1.553
v2mebias -3.585 3.732 0.264 1.702
v2mecorrpt -3.179 3.456 0.162 1.645
v2pepwrses -2.950 2.988 0.478 1.141
v2pepwrsoc -2.638 3.399 0.543 1.269
v2pepwrgen -2.884 3.876 0.545 1.199
v2pepwrort -2.204 3.485 -0.170 1.242
v2peedueq -3.102 3.634 0.398 1.482
v2pehealth -3.271 3.689 0.434 1.503
v2x accountability -1.981 2.175 0.352 1.020
v2x veracc -1.579 1.893 0.415 0.877
v2x diagacc -2.145 2.178 0.364 1.046
v2x horacc -2.144 2.385 0.194 1.048
v2xex elecleg 0 1 0.840 0.335
v2x civlib 0.009 0.978 0.596 0.288
v2x clphy 0.013 0.987 0.580 0.312
v2x clpol 0.009 0.987 0.580 0.334
v2x clpriv 0 0.973 0.630 0.287
v2x corr 0.006 0.976 0.513 0.296
v2x EDcomp thick 0.002 0.958 0.509 0.287
v2x elecreg 0 1 0.854 0.353
v2x freexp 0.011 0.991 0.570 0.324
v2x gencl 0.001 0.985 0.612 0.273
v2x gencs 0.014 0.975 0.603 0.246
v2x hosabort 0 1 0.002 0.039
v2x hosinter 0 1 0.008 0.090
v2x pubcorr 0.004 0.979 0.491 0.300
v2x rule 0.005 0.998 0.520 0.310
v2xcl acjst 0.002 0.995 0.582 0.286
v2xcl disc 0.007 0.992 0.584 0.315
v2xcl dmove 0 0.970 0.634 0.262
v2xcl prpty 0.002 0.949 0.600 0.269
v2xcl slave 0.001 0.969 0.635 0.240
v2xcs ccsi 0.008 0.977 0.576 0.314
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
v2xel elecparl 0 1 0.216 0.412
v2xel elecpres 0 1 0.103 0.305
v2xex elecreg 0 1 0.488 0.500
v2xlg elecreg 0 1 0.852 0.355
v2x ex confidence 0 1 0.329 0.378
v2x ex direlect 0 1 0.366 0.475
v2x ex hereditary 0 1 0.043 0.159
v2x ex military 0 1 0.185 0.236
v2x ex party 0 1 0.148 0.210
v2x execorr 0.011 0.978 0.494 0.301
v2x legabort 0 1 0.002 0.042
v2xlg leginter 0 1 0.020 0.140
v2x neopat 0.006 0.990 0.508 0.308
v2xnp client 0.012 0.986 0.485 0.259
v2xnp pres 0.010 0.989 0.471 0.322
v2xnp regcorr 0.006 0.980 0.499 0.304
diff year prior v2elrgstry -2.725 3.553 0.015 0.232
diff year prior v2elvotbuy -2.877 2.771 -0.002 0.241
diff year prior v2elirreg -3.293 3.108 0.005 0.274
diff year prior v2elintim -3.299 4.569 0.013 0.296
diff year prior v2elpeace -3.617 3.779 0.004 0.295
diff year prior v2elfrfair -3.669 4.702 0.014 0.337
diff year prior v2elmulpar -4.258 4.612 0.022 0.345
diff year prior v2elboycot -4.780 4.759 0.004 0.379
diff year prior v2elaccept -4.225 4.246 0.009 0.328
diff year prior v2elasmoff -7.222 6.927 0.005 0.398
diff year prior v2eldonate -2.113 3.169 0.034 0.215
diff year prior v2elpubfin -1.543 3.918 0.024 0.215
diff year prior v2ellocons -25 3 0.149 0.933
diff year prior v2ellocumul 0 3 0.231 0.463
diff year prior v2elprescons -19 3 0.095 0.576
diff year prior v2elprescumul 0 3 0.126 0.395
diff year prior v2elpaidig -3.108 4.137 0.018 0.258
diff year prior v2elfrcamp -3.996 4.508 0.023 0.294
diff year prior v2elpdcamp -2.968 3.695 0.021 0.267
diff year prior v2elmonref -1 1 0.001 0.104
diff year prior v2elmonden -1 1 0.001 0.092
diff year prior v2x polyarchy -0.475 0.702 0.005 0.046
diff year prior v2x freexp altinf -0.571 0.848 0.005 0.057
diff year prior v2x frassoc thick -0.669 0.827 0.006 0.060
diff year prior v2xel frefair -0.865 0.919 0.005 0.083
diff year prior v2x elecoff -1 1 0.006 0.169
diff year prior v2x liberal -0.474 0.653 0.004 0.047
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
diff year prior v2xcl rol -0.532 0.750 0.004 0.046
diff year prior v2x jucon -0.622 0.822 0.002 0.050
diff year prior v2xlg legcon -0.868 0.939 0.005 0.092
diff year prior v2x partip -0.356 0.525 0.004 0.033
diff year prior v2x cspart -0.508 0.711 0.006 0.052
diff year prior v2xdl delib -0.667 0.821 0.005 0.061
diff year prior v2x egal -0.240 0.438 0.002 0.032
diff year prior v2xeg eqprotec -0.545 0.662 0.002 0.038
diff year prior v2xeg eqaccess -0.340 0.553 0.003 0.040
diff year prior v2xeg eqdr -0.354 0.520 0.001 0.031
diff year prior v2elembaut -3.086 3.922 0.025 0.272
diff year prior v2elembcap -2.259 3.904 0.017 0.216
diff year prior v2elreggov -1 1 0.001 0.045
diff year prior v2ellocgov -1 1 0.001 0.038
diff year prior v2elrsthos -1 1 -0.002 0.083
diff year prior v2elrstrct -1 1 0.001 0.062
diff year prior v2psparban -4.146 4.752 0.031 0.361
diff year prior v2psbars -3.495 4.394 0.027 0.319
diff year prior v2psoppaut -3.628 4.485 0.027 0.345
diff year prior v2psorgs -3.490 3.654 0.013 0.236
diff year prior v2psprbrch -3.340 3.156 0.008 0.222
diff year prior v2psprlnks -2.672 2.899 0.010 0.209
diff year prior v2psplats -2.524 3.900 0.014 0.222
diff year prior v2pscnslnl -3.354 3.022 0.018 0.216
diff year prior v2pscohesv -1.992 2.384 0 0.195
diff year prior v2pscomprg -3.269 3.627 0.005 0.224
diff year prior v2psnatpar -3.754 2.976 -0.003 0.357
diff year prior v2pssunpar -3.920 4.109 0.019 0.272
diff year prior v2exremhsp -3.736 3.063 0.006 0.279
diff year prior v2exdfdshs -4.133 2.845 -0.009 0.265
diff year prior v2exdfcbhs -3.227 3.322 -0.003 0.231
diff year prior v2exdfvths -3.028 3.279 -0.007 0.236
diff year prior v2exdfdmhs -3.283 3.039 -0.005 0.238
diff year prior v2exdfpphs -2.655 4.069 0.010 0.225
diff year prior v2exhoshog -1 1 -0.002 0.148
diff year prior v2exrescon -3.962 5.174 0.007 0.291
diff year prior v2exbribe -3.809 3.285 -0.001 0.237
diff year prior v2exembez -2.847 3.119 -0.001 0.243
diff year prior v2excrptps -2.522 2.919 -0.006 0.191
diff year prior v2exthftps -2.650 2.803 -0.005 0.211
diff year prior v2ex elechos -1 1 0.009 0.168
diff year prior v2ex hogw -1 1 0.001 0.105
diff year prior v2expathhs -8 8 0.038 1.002
diff year prior v2lgbicam -2 2 0.006 0.272
diff year prior v2lgqstexp -2.148 4.149 0.014 0.329
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
diff year prior v2lginvstp -2.661 3.769 0.015 0.337
diff year prior v2lgotovst -2.886 3.431 0.015 0.322
diff year prior v2lgcrrpt -3.966 3.941 -0.008 0.305
diff year prior v2lgoppart -2.730 4.508 0.017 0.366
diff year prior v2lgfunds -3.582 3.419 0.015 0.303
diff year prior v2lgdsadlobin -9.368 9.852 0.001 0.330
diff year prior v2lglegplo -3.600 4.463 0.011 0.310
diff year prior v2lgcomslo -3.627 4.796 0.021 0.288
diff year prior v2lgsrvlo -3.173 2.313 -0.006 0.277
diff year prior v2ex hosw -1 1 -0.001 0.105
diff year prior v2lgamend -1 1 0.002 0.134
diff year prior v2dlreason -3.349 3.548 0.020 0.285
diff year prior v2dlcommon -2.238 3.033 0.013 0.248
diff year prior v2dlcountr -3.128 5.167 0.019 0.320
diff year prior v2dlconslt -3.315 4.817 0.020 0.312
diff year prior v2dlengage -3.446 3.811 0.023 0.306
diff year prior v2dlencmps -2.989 2.427 0.009 0.240
diff year prior v2dlunivl -3.384 4.001 0.007 0.215
diff year prior v2jureform -4.809 4.615 0.005 0.518
diff year prior v2jupurge -3.846 2.964 0.012 0.338
diff year prior v2jupoatck -4.557 3.449 -0.003 0.321
diff year prior v2jupack -3.524 3.724 0.007 0.311
diff year prior v2juaccnt -3.485 2.514 0.009 0.212
diff year prior v2jucorrdc -2.798 2.921 -0.005 0.184
diff year prior v2juhcind -2.791 4.524 0.012 0.265
diff year prior v2juncind -2.590 4.365 0.009 0.238
diff year prior v2juhccomp -2.630 3.685 0.006 0.225
diff year prior v2jucomp -3.511 3.540 0.006 0.224
diff year prior v2jureview -2.607 3.391 0.021 0.238
diff year prior v2clacfree -4.323 4.146 0.021 0.304
diff year prior v2clrelig -3.592 3.765 0.014 0.234
diff year prior v2cltort -3.661 3.753 0.021 0.295
diff year prior v2clkill -3.669 4.046 0.021 0.308
diff year prior v2cltrnslw -3.800 3.261 0.013 0.262
diff year prior v2clrspct -3.727 4.213 0.007 0.252
diff year prior v2clfmove -3.426 4.747 0.021 0.259
diff year prior v2cldmovem -4.805 5.435 0.015 0.247
diff year prior v2cldmovew -4.651 4.495 0.017 0.222
diff year prior v2cldiscm -3.696 4.530 0.025 0.325
diff year prior v2cldiscw -3.274 4.009 0.025 0.297
diff year prior v2clslavem -4.915 2.737 0.010 0.184
diff year prior v2clslavef -4.019 3.731 0.010 0.176
diff year prior v2clstown -3.472 4.145 0.024 0.240
diff year prior v2clprptym -3.345 4.414 0.020 0.190
diff year prior v2clprptyw -3.907 3.834 0.022 0.183
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
diff year prior v2clacjstm -4.656 2.962 0.015 0.229
diff year prior v2clacjstw -4.210 2.785 0.016 0.218
diff year prior v2clacjust -3.102 3.390 0.009 0.185
diff year prior v2clsocgrp -2.108 2.766 0.013 0.184
diff year prior v2clrgunev -3.059 2.875 0.002 0.206
diff year prior v2svdomaut -1.845 4.574 0.013 0.219
diff year prior v2svinlaut -1.799 4.638 0.016 0.219
diff year prior v2svstterr -49.200 38.700 0.006 2.347
diff year prior v2cseeorgs -2.795 4.327 0.026 0.288
diff year prior v2csreprss -3.985 4.545 0.021 0.315
diff year prior v2cscnsult -3.010 3.130 0.023 0.300
diff year prior v2csprtcpt -3.479 4.308 0.029 0.276
diff year prior v2csgender -2.463 2.908 0.022 0.179
diff year prior v2csantimv -3.801 3.993 -0.009 0.353
diff year prior v2csrlgrep -2.723 4.356 0.012 0.256
diff year prior v2csrlgcon -2.856 3.472 0.014 0.237
diff year prior v2mecenefm -4.216 4.783 0.021 0.330
diff year prior v2mecrit -2.574 4.959 0.026 0.301
diff year prior v2merange -4.102 4.757 0.028 0.293
diff year prior v2meharjrn -2.438 4.012 0.019 0.286
diff year prior v2meslfcen -3.382 4.656 0.021 0.315
diff year prior v2mebias -3.820 4.589 0.027 0.326
diff year prior v2mecorrpt -2.923 5.011 0.020 0.272
diff year prior v2pepwrses -2.940 3.437 0.001 0.224
diff year prior v2pepwrsoc -2.018 3.084 0.012 0.188
diff year prior v2pepwrgen -2.046 2.760 0.028 0.185
diff year prior v2pepwrort -1.049 2.210 0.019 0.136
diff year prior v2peedueq -2.006 2.603 0.007 0.168
diff year prior v2pehealth -2.106 2.241 0.006 0.168
diff year prior v2x accountability -2.082 2.455 0.016 0.149
diff year prior v2x veracc -2.361 2.575 0.015 0.250
diff year prior v2x diagacc -1.806 2.640 0.017 0.160
diff year prior v2x horacc -2.186 2.804 0.012 0.186
diff year prior v2xex elecleg -1 1 0.004 0.151
diff year prior v2x civlib -0.589 0.676 0.005 0.046
diff year prior v2x clphy -0.698 0.735 0.004 0.055
diff year prior v2x clpol -0.715 0.828 0.005 0.058
diff year prior v2x clpriv -0.464 0.784 0.004 0.042
diff year prior v2x corr -0.644 0.486 0.001 0.035
diff year prior v2x EDcomp thick -0.542 0.700 0.005 0.056
diff year prior v2x elecreg -1 1 0.005 0.183
diff year prior v2x freexp -0.554 0.794 0.005 0.058
diff year prior v2x gencl -0.467 0.630 0.004 0.038
diff year prior v2x gencs -0.263 0.588 0.006 0.038
diff year prior v2x hosabort -1 1 0 0.050
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
diff year prior v2x hosinter -1 1 0 0.128
diff year prior v2x pubcorr -0.679 0.562 0.001 0.040
diff year prior v2x rule -0.486 0.639 0.001 0.040
diff year prior v2xcl acjst -0.594 0.688 0.003 0.045
diff year prior v2xcl disc -0.690 0.753 0.005 0.060
diff year prior v2xcl dmove -0.446 0.827 0.003 0.044
diff year prior v2xcl prpty -0.473 0.636 0.005 0.035
diff year prior v2xcl slave -0.511 0.708 0.002 0.035
diff year prior v2xcs ccsi -0.524 0.767 0.005 0.057
diff year prior v2xel elecparl -1 1 -0.003 0.643
diff year prior v2xel elecpres -1 1 0.002 0.444
diff year prior v2xex elecreg -1 1 0.009 0.157
diff year prior v2xlg elecreg -1 1 0.005 0.178
diff year prior v2x ex confidence -1 1 0.002 0.083
diff year prior v2x ex direlect -1 1 0.006 0.158
diff year prior v2x ex hereditary -0.595 0.500 0 0.020
diff year prior v2x ex military -0.732 1 -0.002 0.085
diff year prior v2x ex party -0.800 0.800 -0.001 0.049
diff year prior v2x execorr -0.661 0.585 0 0.046
diff year prior v2x legabort -1 1 0 0.061
diff year prior v2xlg leginter -1 1 0 0.197
diff year prior v2x neopat -0.709 0.544 -0.002 0.041
diff year prior v2xnp client -0.505 0.297 -0.001 0.040
diff year prior v2xnp pres -0.837 0.670 -0.003 0.050
diff year prior v2xnp regcorr -0.652 0.464 0.001 0.044
epr groups 1 58 4.656 5.549
epr elf 0.013 1 0.578 0.298
epr excluded groups count 0 55 2.416 4.898
epr excluded group pop 0 0.980 0.153 0.215
epr inpower groups count 1 15 2.240 2.138
epr inpower groups pop 0.020 1.044 0.774 0.255
epr regaut groups count 0 42 0.810 3.430
epr regaut group pop 0 1 0.058 0.199
gdp growth -83.372 453.824 3.582 10.337
gdp pc 77.606 117929.820 9906.629 15970.381
gdp pc growth -83.812 444.666 1.771 10.268
gdp log 18.459 30.460 23.999 2.193
gdp pc log 4.352 11.678 8.093 1.552
state age 1 202 74.118 61.097
pop 4.724 14.159 9.016 1.623
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Table 9: Variables and Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Variable Min Max Mean SD
pt coup attempt 0 1 0.034 0.182
pt coup attempt num 0 4 0.038 0.216
pt coup num 0 2 0.018 0.137
pt coup 0 1 0.018 0.132
pt failed coup attempt num 0 4 0.020 0.157
pt failed coup attempt 0 1 0.018 0.134
pt coup total 0 23 1.977 3.344
pt coup attempt total 0 28 3.088 4.757
pt coup num5yrs 0 5 0.100 0.365
pt coup attempt num5yrs 0 9 0.204 0.617
pt coup num10yrs 0 6 0.218 0.614
pt coup attempt num10yrs 0 10 0.443 1.051
years since last pt coup 0 202 42.533 45.415
years since last pt failed coup attempt 0 202 49.187 54.313
years since last pt coup attempt 0 202 38.090 45.708
internal confl 0 1 0.169 0.375
internal confl major 0 1 0.051 0.220
internal confl minor 0 1 0.130 0.337
internal confl part 0 1 0.278 0.448
internal confl part major 0 1 0.141 0.348
internal confl part minor 0 1 0.176 0.381
war 0 1 0.031 0.173
war major 0 1 0.017 0.131
war minor 0 1 0.014 0.117
any conflict 0 1 0.293 0.455
any conflict major 0 1 0.154 0.361
any conflict minor 0 1 0.183 0.387
ext conf 0 1 0.156 0.363
ext conf major 0 1 0.108 0.310
ext conf minor 0 1 0.068 0.252
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